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a b s t r a c t
Many methods and applications for maritime transportation risk analysis have been presented in the
literature. In parallel, there is a recent focus on foundational issues in risk analysis, with calls for
intensiﬁed research on fundamental concepts and principles underlying the scientiﬁc ﬁeld. This paper
presents a review and analysis of risk deﬁnitions, perspectives and scientiﬁc approaches to risk analysis
found in the maritime transportation application area, focusing on applications addressing accidental
risk of shipping in a sea area. For this purpose, a classiﬁcation of risk deﬁnitions, an overview of elements
in risk perspectives and a classiﬁcation of approaches to risk analysis science are applied. Results reveal
that in the application area, risk is strongly tied to probability, both in deﬁnitions and perspectives, while
alternative views exist. A diffuse situation is also found concerning the scientiﬁc approach to risk
analysis, with realist, proceduralist and constructivist foundations co-existing. Realist approaches
dominate the application area. Very few applications systematically account for uncertainty, neither
concerning the evidence base nor in relation to the limitations of the risk model in relation to the space
of possible outcomes. Some suggestions are made to improve the current situation, aiming to strengthen
the scientiﬁc basis for risk analysis.
& 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Risk analysis methods for maritime transportation have received
a growing interest in recent years, even to the extent that interna-
tional organizations have provided recommendations on the use of
speciﬁc risk analysis and management tools [1–3]. In parallel, there
is a recent focus on foundational issues in scientiﬁc environments
concerned with risk analysis, with calls for intensifying research on
issues such as applied terminology, principles and perspectives for
analyzing and managing risk [4–6].
Answering these calls, this paper provides a review and analysis
of risk analysis applications addressing the accidental risk of mar-
itime transportation in a sea area, in light of some foundational issues
as intended in [5]. A distinction is made between the science of risk
analysis (concerning concepts, principles, methods and models for
analyzing risk) and the practice of risk analysis (concerning speciﬁc
applications) [6].
In particular, the applied risk deﬁnitions, the perspectives for
describing risk, and the scientiﬁc approach to risk analysis as a tool
for supporting decision-making are in focus. This distinguishes the
current work from recent review papers [7–9] as only minimal
attention is given to the structure and content of the methods. Rather,
the methods and applications are reviewed on a high level, focusing
on some risk-theoretic foundations. The research focuses on providing
insight into which risk-theoretical foundations the maritime transpor-
tation area has adopted, aiming to facilitate further reﬂections and
discussions within the maritime research community. Thus, the paper
aims to support the call by Aven and Zio [5], speciﬁcally in the
maritime transportation application area.
A systematic method is taken to review and analyze risk applica-
tions, considering three issues. In Section 2, a brief review of deﬁnitions
for risk is provided, focusing on the question how the risk concept is
deﬁned in particular applications. In Section 3, a brief summary is given
of elements of risk perspectives, focusing on which tools are applied to
measure/describe risk and on the scope of the analysis (events or events
and consequences). In Section 4, a classiﬁcation of scientiﬁc approaches
to risk analysis is presented, utilizing the framework of the realist-
constructivist continuum. This concerns the underlying ontological,
epistemological and normative commitments to risk analysis as a
scientiﬁc activity, which amongst other have implications for the
evidence types considered in the analysis, the extent of uncertainty
treatment and the role of the risk analysis in decision making.
Following themethodological basis, Section 5 presents an overview
of maritime transportation risk analysis applications in light of the
three above aspects. In Section 6, a further analysis is performed,
providing insight in historical developments and cross-dependencies
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between deﬁnitions, perspectives and approaches. A discussion is
made in Section 7 and a conclusion in Section 8.
2. A classiﬁcation of risk deﬁnitions
In Table 1, a brief overview of some categories for deﬁnitions of risk
is given, based on a historic analysis of the risk concept by Aven [10].
These conceptual classes are here used as a basis to obtain insight in
how risk is deﬁned in the application area. Deﬁnitions and discussions
in [10,11] are used to brieﬂy summarize the nine categories.
Category D1 deﬁnes risk as the expected value of the probability of
an event occurrence and the utility of the consequences. In D2, risk is
deﬁned risk as the probability of an undesirable event, or the chance of
a loss. In D3, risk is deﬁned as objective uncertainty, i.e. a probability
distribution over an outcome range (known through calculations or
from statistical data analysis). Category D4 represents deﬁnitions
where risk is equal to uncertainty, understood as a statistical variation
compared with an average value. In category D5, risk is deﬁned as the
possibility of an unfortunate occurrence. D6 deﬁnes risk as the
combination of the probability of occurrence of an event and con-
sequences, without combining these in one unit as in D1. D7 under-
stands risk as objective states of the world, which are considered
existing independent of an assessor. D8 deﬁnes risk as the combination
of events, consequences and the uncertainties of these, where uncer-
tainty is understood as an assessor’s uncertainty about the occurrence
of the events/consequences. D9 deﬁnes risk as an effect on stated
objectives (i.e. a consequence), due to the presence of uncertainty.
3. Elements of risk perspectives
In this section, a brief overview is given of some commonly
found elements of risk perspectives. A risk perspective is here
understood as a way to describe risk, a systematic manner to
analyse and make statements about risk, as in [12]. Three aspects
are considered: the measurement tools (probabilities, indicators,
fuzzy numbers,…), the scope of the analysis (events or events and
consequences), and the tools applied to convey information
regarding the conﬁdence in the analysis (uncertainty and bias
measures). One element of risk measurement tools concerns their
interpretability as it has been argued that this is an important
aspect of practical decision making [13,14].
Table 2 lists the risk perspective elements applicable to the cur-
rent research. Each element is outlined by an abbreviation, a deﬁ-
nition, a short description of its underlying rationale, and a selection
of references where the element is more elaborately discussed.
4. A classiﬁcation of approaches to the science of risk analysis
In a risk analysis, risk is measured/described with the purpose
of informing a decision, but views differ about how to do this [38].
Several researchers have argued that much of the controversy
about risk analysis as a tool for informing decisions is rooted in
fundamentally opposing views on the foundations of risk analysis
as a scientiﬁc activity and opposing views regarding the nature of
the risk concept [39–42].
As the rationale behind these opposing views appears to be less
known outside the more theoretically oriented risk research com-
munity, and no references have been made to it in the maritime
application area, it is considered important to outline some key
features. First, a general introduction to the approaches to risk
analysis science is given, focusing on the earlier proposed realist-
constructivist continuum. Subsequently, a classiﬁcation of the scien-
tiﬁc risk approaches is proposed, which is applied in the subsequent
analysis.
4.1. Realist, constructivist and proceduralist approaches to risk
analysis science
Three broadly differing views on risk analysis can be distin-
guished: realist, constructivist and proceduralist approaches [39–42].
The outlines given below are intended as a basis for making
distinctions, acknowledging that various variations of each approach
exist, e.g. related to the types of evidence considered, and the extent
of uncertainty treatment.
Risk realists typically consider risk as a physically given attribute
of a technology or system, which can be characterized by objective
facts. Risk can thus be explained, predicted and controlled by
science [40]. Under such approaches, risk is essentially character-
ized by quantitative (often probabilistic) information regarding
events or consequences. Other dimensions sometimes attributed
to risk, such as controllability, the voluntariness of exposure and
fear, are seen as accidental dimensions and not part of the risk
concept per se [39,42,43]. Risk realists work under the presumption
that technical analyses are a representation or approximation of an
absolute truth, and typically aim at accurate risk measurement. One
implication of this reiﬁcation of risk is the attempt to make a
clear distinction between facts and non-epistemic values1 [39,40].
Another is the strong link between the calculated risk numbers,
established risk decision criteria and subsequent decision making,
i.e. a risk-based decision making strategy [38,45]. Risk management
decisions are seen as rational to the extent they are based on the
realist, non-personal factors of technical analysis.
Risk constructivists typically hold that risk is a social construct,
attributed to (rather than part of) a technology or system [40]. The
risk analysis is presented as a reﬂection of a mind construct of a
(group of) expert(s) and/or lay people. In strong constructivist
approaches, risk can be characterized by quantitative (probabil-
istic) information regarding events or consequences, but these risk
dimensions are at par with controllability, fear, the voluntariness
of exposure and other psychometric factors. Neither of these are
essential parts of the risk concept, and it is a contextual decision
which are considered relevant [42,46]. Risk constructivists focus
on the cognitive and social dimensions of knowledge claims
regarding risk, place more stress on the importance of uncertainty
and some argue against a strict separation between facts and
values [39]. There often is a strong link to decision making, but risk
analyses are used to inform a decision, requiring a managerial
decision making where other factors are considered as well
[38,45].
An additional distinction can be made related to the role of
stakeholders in the risk analysis process. In the realist and
Table 1
A classiﬁcation of risk deﬁnitions [10].
Risk deﬁnition classes Abbreviation
D1 Risk¼Expected value R¼EV
D2 Risk¼Probability of an (undesirable) event R¼P
D3 Risk¼Objective uncertainty R¼OU
D4 Risk¼Uncertainty R¼U
D5 Risk¼Potential/possibility of a loss R¼PO
D6 Risk¼Probability and scenarios/(severity of) consequences R¼P&C
D7 Risk¼Event or consequence R¼C
D8 Risk¼Consequences/damage/severityþuncertainty R¼C&U
D9 Risk¼Effect of uncertainty on objectives R¼ ISO
1 Non-epistemic values are of a moral, political or aesthetic nature, i.e. values
which have no relevance to determining whether a claim is true but stem from a
reﬂective consideration of what is good in a given context [44].
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constructivist approaches, risk analysis applications are mainly seen
as a process of knowledge transfer from analysts and experts to
decision makers. In the proceduralist approach, different stake-
holders such as scientists, experts, risk-affected lay persons and
policy makers, take part in a process in which risk is characterized
through a shared understanding, balancing facts and values [39].
Hence, risk analysis and related decision making is understood
through an analytic-deliberative process [47].
4.2. Applied classiﬁcation of approaches to risk analysis science
The general approaches to risk analysis as a scientiﬁc discipline as
outlined in Section 4.1 are further distinguished by considering a
number of criteria used to classify the risk analysis applications in
Section 5. The presented classiﬁcation distinguishes eight classes, see
Table 3 and Fig. 1. Following criteria are considered for classifying risk
analysis applications to these classes: (i) focus on an underlying true
risk, (ii) reliance on data and models from natural or engineering
sciences, (iii) reliance on expert judgment, (iv) reliance on non-
epistemic values, (v) reliance on lay people’s judgment, (vi) extent
of uncertainty assessment, (vii) stakeholder involvement, (viii) con-
sideration of contextual attributes (fear, voluntariness, etc.), and (ix)
relation between the risk analysis and decision-making.
The characteristics of the classes are summarized in Table 3,
where some references are given to work where (some aspects of)
the approaches are more elaborately described. A visual represen-
tation of the classiﬁcation is given in Fig. 1, clearly showing the
multi-faceted diversity in approaches to risk analysis.
5. Risk analysis applications for maritime transportation
In this section, a concise overview is given of the maritime
transportation risk analysis applications, i.e. applications analyzing
the accidental risk of maritime transportation in a given waterway
or sea area. The review covers the period from 1970 to 2014, using
a total of 58 applications. For each analysis, following character-
istics are determined in Tables 4–7:
(i) the analysis aims and scope;
(ii) the applied deﬁnition of risk, see Table 1;
(iii) the applied tools to measure risk, see Table 2;
(iv) whether events (A), or events and consequences (A, C) are
accounted for;
(v) the tools applied to convey information regarding the con-
ﬁdence in the analysis, see Table 2;
(vi) the applied types of evidence (data, models, expert judg-
ments, layperson judgments, non-epistemic values);
(vii) the consideration of contextual attributes (fear, voluntary
exposure, equity, etc.);
(viii) the adopted approach to risk analysis science, according to
the classiﬁcation of Table 3.
The risk perspectives are denoted as R(x1,…,xn, y1, y2|z1,…zm) or
R(x1,…,xn-y1, y2|z1,…zm), where “” signiﬁes “is described by”,
“-”means “refers to” and “|” represents “conditional to”. For analyses
where the actual occurrence of events and/or consequences is
measured, the elements are simply listed. For analyses where the
occurrence of events and/or consequences is not measured per se, but
rather inferred from other measures, the symbol “-” is used. The
Table 2
Outline of the elements of risk perspectives applied in maritime transportation risk analysis.
Deﬁnition Ref.
Rationale of the measurement tool
Pf Frequentist probability [13,15–
17]Fraction of time a speciﬁed outcome occurs in an in principle inﬁnite number of repeated tests
A distinction is made between Pf as a concept and its measurement Pfn, which is derived from empirical data, a thought-constructed “repeated experiment” or
a repeated evaluation of an engineering or statistical model
Ps Subjective probability [13,15–
17]Degree of belief of an assessor based on evidence available to him/her, i.e. a measure of outcome uncertainty
Px Modelled probability [18–20]
Calculated probability measure based on a data- or judgment-based model, mapping non-probabilistic predictor variables to a probability (or probability-
like) scale
IQU Quantitative indicator [21–23]
A ratio- or interval scale measure of a characteristic of the system, used as a proxy of the occurrence of events and/or consequences. The quantitative
measure is derived from data, or by applying a model in data
IQL Qualitative indicator [21–23]
A categorical or ordinal measure of a characteristic of the system, used as a proxy of the occurrence of events and/or consequences. The qualitative measure
is based on a judgement by an assessor, obtained either through direct judgment or derived from a mathematical model
F Fuzzy number [24–26]
A measure derived from the degree to which a speciﬁc instance belongs to a certain category, i.e. the degree of similarity between the instance and the
category
A Event [27]
A speciﬁc (deﬁned) state of the world and how that speciﬁed state changes or develops over a time interval
C Consequence [27]
A speciﬁc type of event, connected to another event through a causal relation, i.e. under conditions of constant conjunction, temporal succession and spatial
propinquity
UQL Qualitative measure of evidential uncertainty or qualitative measure of the strength of knowledge [28–30]
A linguistic or numerical measure on an ordinal or categorical scale indicating the lack of knowledge (or conversely, the strength of knowledge) for making a
measurement or statement
UQU Quantitative measure of evidential uncertainty [14,31,32]
A numerical measure on an interval or ratio scale, quantifying the epistemic uncertainty related to parameters of a model, e.g. applying imprecise (interval)
probability, probability bound analysis, evidence theory or possibility theory
UAH Alternative hypothesis-based epistemic uncertainty [33,34]
An expression of epistemic uncertainty, in particular related to model structure, by weighing multiple plausible hypotheses related to a given phenomenon
B Bias [35–37]
A categorical or ordinal measure indicating the direction of deviation from what is believed to be an accurate reﬂection of the phenomenon, in relation to the
applied representation of the phenomenon accepted in a given context
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parameters xi (i¼1,…,n) are the measurement tools of Table 2, i.e. Pfn,
Ps, Px, IQU, IQL or F. The parameters yj (j¼1,2) are related to the scope of
the analysis, i.e. events A or consequences C. In applications where
consequences are not assessed, but it is stated that for performing a
full risk analysis, consequences need to be considered, the symbol Cn
is used. The parameters zk (k¼1,…,m) are the tools for conveying
information regarding the conﬁdence in the analysis, i.e. UQL, UQU, UAH
and B, see Table 2. Where the parameter zk is placed between brackets
[ ], this signiﬁes that the application mentions the need for consider-
ing uncertainty, but that it is not systematically assessed.
A note is in place concerning the deduction of the characteristics
of the risk analysis applications. Some characteristics are quite
straightforward to assess. For instance, the deﬁnitions (when given),
are collected directly from the text. Likewise, it is quite straightfor-
ward to determine what kind of evidence is considered relevant in
the analysis, if uncertainty is assessed and if contextual attributes
are considered in the analysis. However, the adopted approach to
risk analysis is based on an interpretation. In most cases, it is very
difﬁcult to assess what exactly the theoretical basis of the risk
assessment is as this is typically not elaborated upon. The char-
acteristics of Table 3 are taken as a guide to make this assessment,
but it is acknowledged that some classiﬁcations can be subject to
discussion. In this context, it is reminded that the analysis is not
aimed at a precise delineation of each method. Rather, a broad
Table 3
Applied classiﬁcation of approaches to risk analysis science.
RA Approach Characteristics Ref.
I Strong realist  Risk is considered to exist objectively as a physical attribute of a system, and the analysis is presented as
an estimate of this underlying true risk
 Exclusively relies on data collected from the system or on engineering / natural science models
 Expert judgment is not considered a source of evidence
 Evidence uncertainty is not considered
 Stakeholders are not involved in analysis process
 Strict separation between facts and non-epistemic values
 Contextual risk attributes are not considered
 Strong relation to established risk decision criteria; risk-based decision making
[39,43]
II Moderate realist  Similar as the strong realist approach
 Heavily relies on data collected from the system or on engineering / natural science models
 Expert judgment considered a source of evidence, but knowledge generated by experts is seen as a last
resort and/or is seen as truth approaching
 Evidence uncertainty is not considered, or only sporadically mentioned
[48]
III Moderate realist with uncertainty
quantiﬁcation
 Similar as moderate realist approach
 Evidence uncertainty is considered through quantiﬁcation of uncertainty about parameters of a model
[35,49,50]
IV Scientiﬁc proceduralist  Relies on data collected from the system, engineering/natural science models, as well as expert and
layperson’s judgment
 Evidence uncertainty may or may not be considered in the analysis
 Broad stakeholders process set up to perform risk analysis and decision making
 Facts and non-epistemic values are considered relevant in characterizing risk
 Contextual risk attributes may or may not be considered
[39,47]
V Precautionary constructivist  Similar as moderate constructivist
 Evidence uncertainty may or may not be considered in the analysis
 Facts and non-epistemic values are considered relevant in characterizing risk
[35,36]
VI Moderate constructivist with
uncertainty evaluation
 Similar as moderate constructivist
 Risk exists objectively in the sense of broad-intersubjectivity
 Risk is understood as an assessor’s uncertainty about events/consequences
 Model-based risk analysis accompanied by broad qualitative uncertainty assessment, possibly including
quantitative evaluation of alternative hypotheses
 Non-epistemic values are excluded from the risk characterization
[29,51–53]
VII Moderate constructivist  The analysis is presented as a reﬂection of an assessor’s mental construct
 Relies on data collected from the system, engineering / natural science models, as well as expert
judgment
 Evidence uncertainty is not considered
 Stakeholders are not involved in analysis process
 Non-epistemic values are excluded from the risk characterization
 Contextual risk attributes are not considered
 Clear link to decision making, in terms of a managerial review, where other decision criteria are
considered along with the risk analysis
[15,54]
VIII Strong constructivist  Risk is a social construct, involving factual and psycho-perceptual attributes
 Primarily lay person’s judgment, which may be informed by expert judgment, data collected from the
system and engineering / natural science models
 Evidence uncertainty and non-epistemic values may or may not be considered
 Contextual risk attributes are considered; and their importance may exceed that of data, models and
expert judgment if the analysis is part of a decision process
 Risk information is not necessarily part of a decision process
[39,46,55]
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Fig. 1. Conceptual outline of the applied classiﬁcation of scientiﬁc approaches to risk analysis.
Table 4
Summary of risk analysis applications for maritime transportation, period 1970s–2000.
ID Analysis aim and scope
Ref Risk deﬁnition
Year RD RP RA D M J NEV CA
M1 Study effect of visibility on the number of collisions and groundings in a waterway
[56] Not deﬁned
1974 N/A R(Pfn, A) I Y Y N N N
M2 Determine the expected number of collisions in a sea area
[57] Not deﬁned
1974 N/A R(Pfn, A) I Y Y N N N
M3 Evaluate collision risk in a waterway environment
[58] Not deﬁned
1995 N/A R(IQL, A) II Y Y Y N N
M4 Determine the frequency and consequences of collision and grounding in a waterway
[59] Not deﬁned
1995 N/A R(Pfn, A, C) I Y Y N N N
M5 Determine the risk of collision in a waterway
[60] Not deﬁned
1995 N/A R(Px, A, Cn) I Y N N N N
M6 Quantify effect of risk reduction measures on oil spills due to ship accidents
[61] Risk is the product of the probability of occurrence and the consequences (p. 236)
1998 D1 R(Pfn, Px, A, Cn | [UQL]) IV Y Y Y N N
M7 Determine occurrence frequency and consequences of various accident types in a sea area
[62] Not deﬁned
2000 N/A R(Pfn, Ps, A, C | [UQL]) II Y Y Y N N
M8 Quantify effect of risk management interventions on risk of oil spills due to ship accidents
[63] Not deﬁned
2000 N/A R(Pfn, Px, A, C) IV Y Y Y N N
Note: ID¼ identiﬁcation number, RD¼risk deﬁnition (abbreviations as in Table 1), RP¼risk perspective (abbreviations as in Table 2), RA¼approach to risk analysis science
(classiﬁcation as in Table 3), D¼data, M¼model, J¼ judgment, NEV¼non-epistemic values, CA¼contextual attributes, Y¼ included in analysis, N¼not included in analysis.
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insight into the various applied risk deﬁnitions, perspectives and
approaches to risk analysis is provided for facilitating further
reﬂections and discussions.
The overview in Tables 4–7 clearly shows that risk analysis in
maritime transportation has attracted increasing attention espe-
cially over the last decade. It is infeasible to discuss the classiﬁca-
tions of risk deﬁnition, perspective and approach to risk analysis
for all methods. In Appendix A, some methods are discussed in
more detail to exemplify the differences.
6. Analysis of risk deﬁnitions, perspectives and approaches to
risk analysis science
In this section, the risk deﬁnitions, perspectives and approaches
to risk analysis as a science are analyzed, based on the overview
presented in Section 5. First, a historic overview is given of the risk
deﬁnitions and approaches to risk analysis. Then, the relationship
between risk deﬁnitions and approaches to risk analysis science is
analyzed. Finally, the perspectives in risk analysis applications are
inspected, grouped by the applied risk deﬁnitions and the adopted
approaches to risk analysis science.
6.1. Historic overview of risk deﬁnition and approach to risk analysis
In Fig. 2, a historic overview of the applied risk deﬁnitions is given.
A wide variety of deﬁnitions is found, but in about half of the
applications, no explicit deﬁnition is provided. Of the nine categories
in Section 2, deﬁnitions are clustered in the categories D1 (R¼EV) and
D6 (R¼P&C), with a few cases found in categories D5 (R¼PO), D2
(R¼P), D7 (R¼C) and D8 (R¼C&U). Thus, in the maritime transpor-
tation application area, risk has been strongly tied to probabilities.
Only weak historic trends can be identiﬁed: from 2010 onwards, more
applications stipulate a deﬁnition, with a continued predominance of
categories D1 (R¼EV) and D6 (R¼P&C). Deﬁnitions D5 (R¼PO) are
found since 2005, D2 (R¼P) and D8 (R¼C&U) only recently. This
diversity conﬁrms ﬁndings in [5] that the scientiﬁc risk discipline
faces terminological challenges.
The ﬁndings furthermore reﬂect the analysis by Aven [10] that
traditional engineering deﬁnitions (D1 and D6) and deﬁnitions of
decision analysts (D1) represent the predominant views on risk in
technical application areas. Aven ([10], p. 40) claims that deﬁnitions
D8 (R¼C&U), considering uncertainty rather than probability a
fundamental component of risk, have recently replaced probability-
based deﬁnitions in engineering ﬁelds. From our analysis, it is seen
that this is only very minimally the case for the maritime transporta-
tion application area. In fact, only one such deﬁnition is found.
A more policy-oriented issue is that many applications do not
follow the suggested deﬁnitions by relevant authorities or standardi-
zation organizations. In the guidelines for Formal Safety Assessment
(FSA), which is commonly seen as the premier scientiﬁc method for
maritime risk analysis and for formulating maritime regulatory policy
[114], risk is deﬁned as “the combination of the frequency and the
severity of the consequence” [115], i.e. a categorization in line with
class C6. While deﬁnitions based on expected values (D1) are close to
this view as it consists of the same elements, deﬁnitions in line with
D5 and D8 represent signiﬁcantly different risk classes. The ISO-
deﬁnition, seeing risk as “the effect of uncertainty on objectives” [116],
is not found in the application area.
In Fig. 3, a historic overview of the approach to risk analysis science
is shown. It is seen that strong realist views (I) on risk analysis are
found from the early work in the application area to the present day.
Similarly, there has been much work in line with a moderate realist
approach (II) to risk analysis over the same time span. Moderate
constructivist approaches (VII) are found since about 2007. Scientiﬁc
proceduralist approaches (IV) were the predominant view around the
year 2000, but are overall less prominently found. Few applications are
found using approaches where uncertainty is quantiﬁed (III), and also
precautionary approaches (V) and constructivist approaches with a
broad uncertainty evaluation (VI) are exceptions.
The historic overview clearly shows that awide range of approaches
co-exist in the application area, conﬁrming ﬁndings in [5,39,40] that
there are different paradigms to risk analysis as a scientiﬁc activity.
Table 5
Summary of risk analysis applications for maritime transportation, period 2001–2005.
ID Analysis aim and scope
Ref Risk deﬁnition
Year RD RP RA D M J NEV CA
M9 Quantify effect of risk reducing measures on transportation risk in a waterway area
[64] Risk is deﬁned by combining likelihood of undesirable event and relevant consequences. (p. 128)
2001 D6 R(Pfn, Px, A, C) IV Y Y Y N N
M10 Determine frequency, damage and costs of collision and grounding accidents
[65] Not deﬁned
2002 N/A R(Pfn, Ps, A, C) II Y Y Y N N
M11 Propose a model for collision probability in a waterway area
[66] Risk is deﬁned as a product of the occurrence frequencies (or probabilities) and consequences. (p. 1)
2002 D1 R(Pfn, A, C) I Y Y N N N
M12 Quantify effect of risk reduction measures on oil spills due to ship accidents
[67] Risk is a measure of the probability and severity of undesirable events. (p. 27)
2002 D6 R(Pfn, Px, A, C) IV Y Y Y N N
M13 Quantify the effect of implementing a Vessel Trafﬁc Monitoring System on accident risk in sea area
[68] Not deﬁned
2002 N/A R(Pfn, Px, A, C | B) V Y Y Y Y N
M14 Determine the expected number of accidents and their consequences in a waterway area
[69] Risk is a parameter used to evaluate (or judge) the signiﬁcance of hazards in relation to safety, […] hazards are the possible events and conditions that may result
in severity. (p. 208)
2005 D5 R(Pfn, Px, A, C) I Y Y N N N
M15 Identify hazards, assess the risks and evaluate potential mitigation measures in a waterway
[70] Risk is the product of the probability of a casualty and its consequences. (p. 1–3)
2005 D1 R(IQL-A, C) IV N N Y N N
Note: ID¼ identiﬁcation number, RD¼risk deﬁnition (abbreviations as in Table 1), RP¼risk perspective (abbreviations as in Table 2), RA¼approach to risk analysis science
(classiﬁcation as in Table 3), D¼data, M¼model, J¼ judgment, NEV¼non-epistemic values, CA¼contextual attributes, Y¼ included in analysis, N¼not included in analysis.
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Most of the work is rooted in the idea that a true, mind-independent
risk exists in line with realist approaches as outlined in Table 3. Using
different modeling approaches, many methods aim to accurately
estimate this true risk. While the use of expert judgment has gained
steady support, many applications rely heavily on accident and trafﬁc
data. Even when judgment is applied, it is often used as if it (should)
uncover(s) an underlying true risk. Constructivist views exist, but broad
assessments of uncertainty and/or bias, used to convey information
regarding the conﬁdence in the analysis, are very rare.
6.2. Relation between risk deﬁnition and approach to risk analysis
science
In Fig. 4, the applied risk deﬁnitions are grouped per approach to
risk analysis science. It is observed that risk deﬁnitions D1 (R¼EV)
are more strongly tied to realist approaches, whereas deﬁnitions in
line with D6 (R¼P&C) are found across the spectrum of approaches
to risk science. Applications where risk is not deﬁned also range
across the different scientiﬁc approaches to risk analysis. The other
applied deﬁnitions are less frequently found, precluding insight in
the relation to the scientiﬁc approaches.
This result implies that the adopted deﬁnition does not neces-
sarily provide much information regarding the adopted scientiﬁc
approach. For example, deﬁning risk through probabilities of events
and consequences (D6) can lead to strong realist approaches to risk
analysis if the risk concept is literally understood as such. However,
the same deﬁnition can be used to subsequently introduce a risk
measure in an analytic-deliberative decision process. Similar con-
siderations can be made for the other deﬁnitions.
From this, it is clear that while providing clarity about deﬁnitions
and terminology is important in applications, this does not sufﬁce to
settle deeper disputes about the feasibility of rationalist, constructi-
vist or proceduralist approaches to risk analysis.
6.3. Risk perspectives in relation to risk deﬁnitions
In Table 8, an overview is shown of the applied risk perspec-
tives in the applications of Section 5, grouped by risk deﬁnition.
Table 6
Summary of risk analysis applications for maritime transportation, period 2006–2010.
ID Analysis aim and scope
Ref Risk deﬁnition
Year RD RP RA D M J NEV CA
M16 Quantify uncertainty in a maritime transportation risk assessment
[71] Not deﬁned
2006 N/A R(Pfn, Px, A, Cn 9 UQU) III Y Y Y N N
M17 Determine the relative risk of various navigation areas in a coastal waterway area
[72] Risk is […] the possibility of the occurrence of hazardous accidents or abnormal incidents. (p. 370)
Risk is […] a consequence involved in the damages resulting from a hazardous accident. (p. 370) Risk possesses diplex-characteristics [sic] of possibility (F) and
severity (N) […] frequency (F) can be viewed as the ratio of number of accidents against the number of ship’s activities per unit time (p.370)
2007 D5/D7 R(F, A, C) VII N N Y N N
M18 Investigate the effect on collision and grounding risk of introducing a TSS in a sea area
[73] Risk is the product of the probability and the consequences of an unwanted event (p. 8)
2008 D1 R(Pfn, A, C) I Y Y N N N
M19 Determine the accident probability and consequences in a sea area
[74] Not deﬁned
2008 N/A R(A, Pfn, C) I Y Y N N N
M20 Determine the collision risk in a part waterway through a vessel-conﬂict technique
[75] Not deﬁned
2009 N/A R(Px, A) VII Y N Y N N
M21 Propose a meta-model for integrated environmental oil spill risk from ship accidents
[76] Not deﬁned
2009 N/A R(Pfn, Ps, A, C) VII Y Y Y N N
M22 Quantify effect of risk reduction measures on accident risk in a waterway area
[77] Not deﬁned
2009 N/A R(Pfn, Px, A, C) VII Y Y Y N N
M23 Determine the collision risk in a part waterway through a vessel-conﬂict technique
[78] Not deﬁned
2010 N/A R(Px, A) VII Y N Y N N
M24 Determine the grounding frequency in a waterway
[79] Not deﬁned
2010 N/A R(Pfn, A, Cn) I Y Y N N N
M25 Determine expected economic loss due to environmental pollution from oil tankers, for various sea areas
[80] Risk is the value of loss under uncertainty, i.e. it is a sum of products of probabilities of occurrence of certain damages. (p. 61)
2010 C1 R(A, Pfn, Ps, C) II Y Y Y N N
M26 Propose a meta-model for minimizing ecological risks of maritime transportation in a sea area
[81] The concept of risk contains both the probability of a certain event and the magnitude of the harm caused if it becomes true
2010 C6 R(Pfn, Ps, A, C) VII Y Y Y N N
M27 Determine the frequency and consequences of collision in a waterway
[82] Not deﬁned
2010 N/A R(Px, A, C) I Y Y N N N
M28 Determine the ship collision probability in a sea area
[83] Risk is deﬁned as the product of probability of occurrence of an undesired event and the expected consequences. (p. 573)
2010 C1 R(Pfn, Px, A, Cn) I Y Y N N N
M29 Calculate maritime accident frequencies in a sea area
[84] Risk is the product of the probability/frequency of the unwanted event and its consequences. (p. 10)
2010 C1 R(Pfn, A, Cn) I Y Y N N N
Note: ID¼ identiﬁcation number, RD¼risk deﬁnition (abbreviations as in Table 1), RP¼risk perspective (abbreviations as in Table 2), RA¼approach to risk analysis science
(classiﬁcation as in Table 3), D¼data, M¼model, J¼ judgment, NEV¼non-epistemic values, CA¼contextual attributes, Y¼ included in analysis, N¼not included in analysis.
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Table 7
Summary of risk analysis applications for maritime transportation, period 2011–2014.
ID Analysis aim and scope
Ref Risk deﬁnition
Year RD RP RA D M J NEV CA
M30 Determine the ship collision probability in a sea area
[85] Risk is deﬁned as the product of the probability of occurrence of an undesired event and the expected consequences. (p. 91)
2011 D1 R(Pfn, A, Cn) I Y Y N N N
M31 Determine expected oil spill costs due to maritime accidents in a sea area
[86] Risk is deﬁned as the product of the probability of occurrence of an undesirable event and the expected consequences (p. 91)
2011 D1 R(Pfn, Px, A, C) I Y Y N N N
M32 Quantify effect of risk reduction measures on oil spills due to ship accidents
[87] Risk is the complete set of triplets {(si, li, ci)}c where si describes the context of the accident scenario, li the likelihood of an accident occurring in that scenario and
ci a description of the consequences. (p. 251)
2011 D6 R(Pfn, Px, A, C) VII Y Y Y N N
M33 Determine the sea areas where collisions are more likely and evaluate effect of speed limits
[88] Not deﬁned
2011 N/A R(IQU-A) II Y Y Y N N
M34 Determine effect of a new trafﬁc scheme on the oil spill probability and consequences in a sea area
[89] Risk is the frequency of a hazard multiplied by its consequence. The term is, however, often used as a mere probability of an accident/incident with adverse
consequences (p. 246)
2012 D1/D2 R(Pfn, A, C) I Y Y N N N
M35 Quantify effect of risk reduction measures on accident risk in a waterway area
[90] Risk is the combination of situations, likelihoods and consequences. (p. 72)
2012 D6 R(Pfn, Px, A, C) VII Y Y Y N N
M36 Propose a simulation environment for evaluating the risk in a sea area
[91] Risk is the possibility of an adverse event. (p. 58)
2012 D5 R(IQL, A) II N Y Y N N
M37 Determine the risk of oil spill and hazardous substances in a sea area
[92] A measure of both the likelihood and consequence, if a hazard manifests itself (p. RMN-14)
2012 D6 R(Pfn, Ps, A, C) II Y Y Y N N
M38 Determine probability of tanker collisions and probability of an oil spill in a sea area
[93] Risk is a set of triplets {(si, li, ci)}, i¼1, 2, 3… with si the context of the accident scenario, li the likelihood of the accident occurring in that scenario and ci the
evaluation of the consequence in the scenario. (p. 381)
2012 D6 R(Pfn, Ps, A, C) II Y Y Y N N
M39 Investigate the sensitivity and discuss uncertainty about the impact scenarios in tanker collisions
[94] Risk is the complete set of triplets {(si, li, xi)}c where si deﬁnes the description of the ith risk scenario path, li the likelihood of the path occurrence and xi represents
the consequences of the path. (p. 75)
2012 D6 R(Pfn, Ps, A, C 9 [UQL]) II Y Y Y N N
M40 Determine the collision risk in a waterway
[95] Not deﬁned
2012 N/A R(Px, A) II Y N Y N N
M41 Determine the probability and consequences of collision between LNG vessel and harbor tug
[96] Risk is the product of the probability of a scenario and the consequences of a scenario. (p. 7)
2012 D1 R(Pfn, Ps, A, C) II Y Y Y N N
M42 Calculate the collision frequency in a waterway
[97] Not deﬁned
2012 N/A R(Pfn, Ps, A, Cn) II Y Y Y N N
M43 Determine the relative risk of coastal areas, and determine through statistical analysis if risk level is acceptable
[98] Risk is the possibility of a harmful event. (p.33) Risk is the consequences of the normal level of event leading to injury. (p.33) Risk is of double characteristics with
frequency and consequences degree (p.33)
2012 D5/D7/D6 R(Pfn, IQL, A, C) VII Y N Y N N
M44 Determine the accidental risk of chemical tanker spills in a given sea area
[99] Risk is the probability of something adverse happening multiplied by the consequences. (p. 10)
2012 D1 R(Pfn, Px, A, C 9 [UQL]) II Y Y N N N
M45 Determine the areas of a waterway where collisions are more likely
[100] Not deﬁned
2012 N/A R(Px, IQU-A) II Y N Y N N
M46 Calculate the collision frequency in a waterway
[101] Not deﬁned
2012 N/A R(Pfn, A, Cn) I Y Y N N N
M47 Calculate collision frequency with vessels laying at an anchorage
[102] Risk is the combination of number of occurrences per time unit and the severity of their consequences (p. 287) Risk is the probability of an event multiplied by its
expected damage. (p. 287)
2013 D6/D1 R(Pfn, A, Cn) I Y Y N N N
M48 Determine the collision risk of maritime trafﬁc in a sea area
[103] Risk can be deﬁned as the probability of occurrence of an unwanted event multiplied by the consequences of that same event. (p. 888)
2013 D1 R(Pfn, A, Cn) I Y Y N N N
M49 Examine the feasibility of data-based generalized linear modeling technique to risk analysis of navigation
[104] Not deﬁned
2013 N/A R(Px, A) I Y N N N N
M50 Propose a method to quantify uncertainty related to trafﬁc data in maritime risk assessment
[105] Not deﬁned
2013 N/A R(Pfn, A, Cn 9 UQU) III Y Y N N N
M51 Determine the accident risk of maritime transportation in an inland waterway
[106] A risk is composed of two elements: an event or accident occurrence probability and its impact, also known as the consequence severity. (p. 96)
Risk is often deﬁned as the combination [product] of its probability and consequences (p. 100)
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Only cases where an explicit deﬁnition is provided, are retained.
The reader is reminded that a risk perspective is here understood
as a way to describe risk, a systematic manner to analyse and make
statements about risk, see Section 3. Risk descriptions contain
measurement tools (Pfn, Ps, Px, IQU, IQL and F, see Table 2), which
address an event (A) or events and consequences (A and C), and
may be supplemented by measures regarding the conﬁdence in
the analysis (UQU, UQL, UAH and B, see Table 2).
It is seen that the elements of the risk perspectives are usually
well in line with the adopted deﬁnition. For example, applications
using the deﬁnition D1 (R¼EV) focus on events and consequences
as implied in the deﬁnition, and use probabilities to describe risk.
A similar conclusion can be drawn from perspectives in applica-
tions where deﬁnition D6 (R¼P&C) is applied.
However, aberrations occur, for example regarding the scope of
the analysis. In deﬁnition classes D2 (R¼P) and D7 (R¼C), the
applications analyze events as well as consequences, whereas the
deﬁnition only focuses on an event, without reference to conse-
quences. Likewise, in deﬁnition classes D1 (R¼EV) and D6 (R¼P&C),
there are instances where risk is not measured using probabilities (as
implied in the deﬁnitions), but using indicators (e.g. M15, M43 and
M51) or fuzzy numbers (M17).
It is also noteworthy that in applications where deﬁnitions D5
(R¼PO) or D7 (R¼C) are used, i.e. deﬁnitions where no reference
Table 7 (continued )
ID Analysis aim and scope
Ref Risk deﬁnition
Year RD RP RA D M J NEV CA
2013 D6/D1 R(Pfn, Ps, IQU, IQL, A, C) VII Y Y Y N N
M52 Propose tools to assess uncertainty and bias in a maritime transportation risk model through a case study
[107] Risk is deﬁned through scenarios, probabilities and consequences. (p. 2296)
2014 D6 R(Pfn, Ps, Px, A, C 9 UQL, B) V Y Y Y Y N
M53 Determine the effect of implementing a navigation service of collision and grounding risk in a sea area
[108] Not deﬁned
2014 N/A R(Ps, A, Cn) VII N N Y N N
M54 Propose a framework for analyzing risk in a sea area through a case study of RoPax vessels
[109] Risk is […] a condition under which it is possible both to deﬁne a comprehensive set of all possible outcomes and to resolve a discrete set of probabilities across
this array of outcomes. (p. 143)
2014 D2 R(Pfn, Ps, Px, A, C 9 UQU) III Y Y Y N N
M55 Calculate the frequency of ship sinking due to collision in a waterway
[110] Not deﬁned
2014 N/A R(Pfn, A, Cn) I Y Y N N N
M56 Apply a method for analyzing evidence uncertainty through a case study of risk of chemical tanker collisions
[111] Risk could be deﬁned and foremost taken as the uncertainty regarding (negative) outcomes. (p. 26)
2014 D8 R(Pfn, Ps, Px, A, C 9 UQL) VI Y Y Y N N
M57 Determine the risk of shipping routes in a sea area
[112] Not deﬁned
2014 N/A R(IQL, F-A) VII Y N Y N N
M58 Apply a failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) method to ship collision risk in a sea area
[113] Not deﬁned
2014 N/A R(F, A, C) VII Y N Y N N
Note: ID¼ identiﬁcation number, RD¼risk deﬁnition (abbreviations as in Table 1), RP¼risk perspective (abbreviations as in Table 2), RA¼approach to risk analysis science
(classiﬁcation as in Table 3), D¼data, M¼model, J¼ judgment, NEV¼non-epistemic values, CA¼contextual attributes, Y¼ included in analysis, N¼not included in analysis
Fig. 2. Historic overview of the applied risk deﬁnitions in applications of maritime transportation risk analysis, classiﬁcation as in Table 1, cases from Tables 4–7.
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is made to a speciﬁc measurement tool, indicators (M36, M43) and
fuzzy numbers (M17) are relatively more frequently found than in
other deﬁnition classes.
It is furthermore observed that very few applications take a
perspective where measures to assess the conﬁdence in the analysis
are considered, irrespective of the risk deﬁnition class. Only in the
application where risk is deﬁned through uncertainty (M56) a broad
uncertainty assessment is performed. In some applications using
probability-based deﬁnitions, uncertainty is considered through alter-
native hypotheses (M52, M54) or a broad uncertainty and bias
assessment (M54). In deﬁnition classes D5 (R¼PO) and D7 (R¼C),
the reviewed applications do not consider uncertainties or biases in
the adopted risk perspectives.
Thus, it can be concluded that there generally is a very signiﬁcant
relation between the adopted deﬁnitions and the applied risk per-
spectives, which conﬁrms claims that how one deﬁnes and under-
stands risk to a large degree determines how one assesses it [55,117].
6.4. Risk perspectives in relation to approach to risk analysis science
In Table 9, an overview is shown of the applied risk perspec-
tives in the applications of Section 5, grouped by the adopted
approach to risk analysis science. This provides insight into how
the application area has understood risk analysis, in light of the
criteria outlined in Section 4.2, see Table 3.
In the strong realist approaches, risk perspectives consist
exclusively of probabilistic risk measures (Pfn and Px). The evidence
base for these probabilities consists exclusively of data or models.
Probabilities of accident occurrences are calculated directly from
observed frequencies (Pfn, e.g. M19) or through probability models
(Px, e.g. M5). Uncertainties are not assessed, and the analysis is
presented as a representation of a true underlying risk.
Moderate realist approaches show a more diverse spectrum of
risk perspectives. While still dominated by probabilistic measures in
terms of Pfn and Px, subjective probabilities Ps are also applied, e.g. in
Fig. 3. Historic overview of the adopted scientiﬁc approaches to risk analysis in applications of maritime transportation risk analysis, classiﬁcation as in Table 3, cases from
Tables 4–7.
Fig. 4. Relation between applied risk deﬁnitions (Table 1) and adopted scientiﬁc approaches to risk analysis (Table 3) in applications of maritime transportation risk analysis,
cases from Tables 4–7.
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M7, M10 and M37. However, they are used only as a supplement to
applications and models otherwise strongly relying on data and
models, and the analyses aim at representing a true underlying risk.
Quantitative and qualitative indicators IQU and IQL are also used as
measurement tools in risk perspectives. Such indicators are deﬁned
based on expert judgment (e.g. M33), but they are metrics derived
directly from ship trafﬁc data. Alternatively, they are judgments
modeled based on experiments involving experts (M3). Uncertain-
ties are typically not assessed, but some applications address some
uncertainties (M39 and M44), or state that data or model-related
uncertainties should be analyzed (M7).
In moderate realist approaches with uncertainty quantiﬁcation,
the focus is also on frequentist, subjective and/or modeled
probabilities Pfn, Ps and Px, but quantitative measures of uncertainty
supplement these. In M16, uncertainty is considered through
Bayesian simulation, i.e. by sampling probability distributions
about parameters of a probability model. In M50, uncertainty is
quantiﬁed using the Dempster–Shafer evidence theory. In M54,
uncertainty is considered in a Bayesian Network framework
through the application of alternative hypotheses.
Scientiﬁc proceduralist approaches (M6, M8, M9 and M12)
combine frequentist probabilities Pfn and probabilities modeled
based on expert judgment Px, using a Bayesian paired comparison
technique [20]. Alternatively, qualitative indicators IQL are applied,
based on judgments of experts of different stakeholder groups.
Uncertainties are either summarily addressed (M6), or not con-
sidered in the analyses.
Moderate constructivist approaches show a rather scattered
landscape of risk perspectives. Various types of probability are
applied: Pfn as derived from data (e.g. M21), Ps as degrees of belief
of an assessor (e.g. M53) and Px as modeled representations of
experts’ judgments (e.g. M23, M32), where judgments of an
assessor are the predominant type of evidence. Compared with
realist approaches, relatively more use is made of indicators (e.g.
M43, M51) and of fuzzy numbers (e.g. M17, M58). Uncertainties
are not considered beyond the probabilities, indicators and fuzzy
numbers.
Precautionary constructivist and moderate constructivist appro-
aches with uncertainty evaluation also apply the different types of
probability. Judgments, data and models are combined in a model
construct, which is supplemented with a systematic assessment of
biases (M13), uncertainties (M56) or uncertainties and biases (M52).
7. Discussion: Risk analysis science and practice in the
maritime transportation application area
In this section, a general discussion is given based on the
ﬁndings from the previous sections. The following issues are
addressed: (i) the need to clarify risk-theoretical issues in applica-
tions, (ii) the need to systematically consider uncertainty, and (iii)
the need for further reﬂection on science and practice in the
application area.
7.1. The need to clarify risk-theoretical issues in applications
A signiﬁcant ﬁnding of the current research is that many
applications provide little or no attention to risk-theoretical issues,
concerning deﬁnitions, perspectives and scientiﬁc approaches to
risk analysis. Risk is often not explicitly deﬁned, and no attention
is paid to how the risk concept is understood. Where risk is
deﬁned, the adopted deﬁnition is typically presented as if no
alternatives exist, or no argumentation is given why the deﬁnition
is taken. This practice may be problematic for several reasons.
First, the lack of clarity may lead to terminological confusion and
deﬁnitional conﬂicts in risk communication [49,118]. Second, sev-
eral authors have argued that the choice of a deﬁnition is not a
value-neutral endeavor: including or excluding contextual attri-
butes (voluntariness, fear, equity etc.) in the risk deﬁnition has a
relation to normative commitments in risk management [119–121].
Third, even if contextual factors are excluded, different deﬁnitions
can represent an opposing conceptual understanding of risk, from
which important differences in risk perspectives can result. As
found in Section 6.3, probability-based deﬁnitions D1 (R¼EV) and
D6 (R¼P&C) commonly lead to probability-based perspectives,
whereas possibility-based deﬁnitions like D5 (R¼PO) are more
frequently found with perspectives applying indicators or fuzzy
numbers. Uncertainty-based deﬁnitions like D8 (R¼C&U) lead to a
broader risk perspective where other uncertainty factors (under-
lying the risk model or beyond the modeling scope) are assessed as
well. The adapted terminology thus guides, supports, but may also
limit which elements are considered in describing risk.
In the application area, there is typically no explicit attention
given to the scientiﬁc approach underlying risk analysis applications,
i.e. it is not clariﬁed whether a realist or constructivist risk founda-
tion is adopted. In fact, no work is found in the maritime application
area where these distinctions are introduced or referred to. None-
theless, as clear from Table 3, the differences are important, for
several reasons.
First, considering risk analysis as a science focusing on a ‘true’,
mind-independent underlying risk (realist approaches) or as a
Table 8
Analysis of applied measurement tools and tools for conveying conﬁdence in
analysis by risk deﬁnition as in Table 1, cases from Tables 4–7.
Risk
deﬁnition
ID Year Pfn Ps Px IQU IQL F A C Cn UQU UQL UAH B
D1: R¼EV M6 1998 x x x x [x]
M11 2002 x x x
M15 2005 x x x
M18 2008 x x x
M25 2010 x x x x
M28 2010 x x x x
M29 2010 x x x
M30 2011 x x x
M31 2011 x x x x
M34 2012 x x x
M41 2012 x x x x
M44 2012 x x x x [x]
M47 2013 x x x
M48 2013 x x x
M51 2013 x x x x x x
D2: R¼P M34 2012 x x x
M54 2014 x x x x x x
D3: R¼OU -
D4: R¼U -
D5: R¼PO M14 2005 x x x
M17 2007 x x x
M36 2012 x x
M43 2012 x x x x
D6: R¼P&C M9 2001 x x x x
M12 2002 x x x x
M17 2007 x x x
M26 2010 x x x x
M32 2011 x x x x
M35 2012 x x x x
M37 2012 x x x x
M38 2012 x x x x
M39 2012 x x x x [x]
M43 2012 x x x x
M47 2013 x x x
M51 2013 x x x x x x
M52 2014 x x x x x x x x
D7: R¼C M17 2007 x x x
M43 2012 x x x x
D8: R¼C&U M56 2014 x x x x x x
D9: R¼ISO -
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reﬂection of a mental construct (constructivist approaches) result in
different risk analysis and subsequent decision making processes. In
the former, risk analysis is a process of fact ﬁnding, i.e. an impersonal
process governed by data collection and processing, and calculation of
quantitative risk metrics using models from engineering and natural
sciences. Decision making is strongly linked to the risk analysis, often
using predeﬁned risk acceptance criteria or mathematical techni-
ques such as optimization or rational choice models, i.e. decision
making is risk-based. In the latter, risk analysis can be understood as a
process of problem ﬁnding, where judgments of a group of analysts
are informed by data and models, possibly supplemented with
uncertainty and/or bias descriptions, providing insight in the strength
of evidence for making the judgments. Decision making here has a
link to the risk analysis results, but it is an evaluative process in which
apart from the quantitative risk metrics, uncertainties and contextual
attributes such as public trust, equity and psychometric factors can be
considered [38,42].
Second, the different commitments to risk analysis science possi-
bly held by the different actors in a risk management problem
(decision makers, analysts, experts, lay people) can lead to important
challenges in communicating about risk. Hence, clarity about the
foundations is of great importance for practical decisionmaking [122].
Table 9
Analysis of applied measurement tools and tools for conveying conﬁdence in analysis by scientiﬁc approach to risk analysis as in Table 3, cases from Tables 4–7.
Scientiﬁc approach to risk analysis ID Year Pfn Ps Px IQU IQL F UQU UQL UAH B










M28 2010 x x
M29 2010 x
M30 2011 x







II Moderate realist M3 1995 x
M7 2000 x x [x]
M10 2002 x x
M25 2010 x x
M33 2011 x
M36 2012 x
M37 2012 x x
M38 2012 x x
M39 2012 x x [x]
M40 2012 x
M41 2012 x x
M42 2012 x x
M44 2012 x x [x]
M45 2012 x x
III Moderate realist with uncertainty quantiﬁcation M16 2006 x x x
M50 2013 x x
M54 2014 x x x x
IV Scientiﬁc proceduralist M6 1998 x x [x]
M8 2000 x x
M9 2001 x x
M12 2002 x x
M15 2005 x
V Precautionary constructivist M13 2002 x x x
M52 2014 x x x x x x
VI Moderate constructivist with uncertainty evaluation M56 2014 x x x x
VII Moderate constructivist M17 2007 x
M20 2009 x
M21 2009 x x
M22 2009 x x
M23 2010 x
M26 2010 x x
M32 2011 x x
M35 2012 x x
M43 2012 x x
M51 2013 x x x x
M53 2014 x
M57 2014 x x
M58 2014 x
VIII Strong constructivist -
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Third, clarity about the different approaches to risk science is
important from a scientiﬁc perspective as well, in relation to the
scientiﬁc review process. As in risk communication, if the authors
and reviewers do not share a common understanding of risk
analysis as a scientiﬁc activity, this can lead to misunderstandings
and misguided expectations. Thus, clarity on the adopted scientiﬁc
basis is important to improve the reviewing process in scientiﬁc risk
journals [6].
7.2. The need to systematically consider uncertainty
One signiﬁcant ﬁnding of the review and analysis in Sections 5 and
6 is the lack of uncertainty treatment in the application area. Only
three applications are found where uncertainty is quantiﬁed (M16,
M50 and M14), and qualitative assessments of uncertainties and/or
biases are equally rare (M13, M52, M56). However, in all three app-
lications analyzed in more detail in Appendix A, important uncerta-
inties which are not addressed in the actual applications, have
been found.
In our view, the systematic consideration of uncertainty is a
fundamental issue in risk analysis, which goes beyond the quantiﬁca-
tion of uncertainty of parameters or model structure. Two aspects are
important. First, uncertainty related to the evidence for making
statements about risk and for constructing the risk model should be
considered, known as “evidence uncertainty” [30]. Second, uncer-
tainty related to the occurrence of the events/consequences, in
relation to the representation by a risk model should be considered.
This is known as “outcome uncertainty” [30], and can be accounted
for through a (qualitative) assessment of uncertainty factors beyond
the model space.
Quantiﬁcation and propagation of parameter uncertainty (as in
M16, M50), or accounting for structural uncertainty through alter-
native hypotheses (M54) can provide conﬁdence in the sense of
bounding model-based uncertainties. However, it is questionable in
how far such quantiﬁcation can in practical settings account for all
relevant evidential and outcome uncertainty. This would in principle
require that a quantitative uncertainty measure is deﬁned about all
parameters and structural assumptions of the entire model, which
are propagated over the entire model space [123]. Such a procedure
is infeasible in practice, such that uncertainty is considered only
about a selection of parameters (M16, M50) or about selected
structural assumptions (M54). It is not clear in how far such
uncertainty quantiﬁcation adequately captures all decision-relevant
uncertainty, because such procedures cannot account for uncertain-
ties stemming from the omission of potentially relevant factors and
because a purely quantiﬁed uncertainty analysis may fail to uncover
the strength of evidential support for various model elements. We
thus favor a broad assessment of the evidence base, as well as a
systematic consideration of uncertainties beyond the model, as in
[28,29]. Evidential biases, when present, can be assessed as well, as
in [36,37].
Uncertainty treatment has been proposed as a validity criterion for
quantitative risk analysis [124]. Another reason for the need to
consider uncertainty is the responsibility of scientists to consider the
consequences of error when informing public policy, which requires
awareness and openness about the limitations in data and informa-
tion, the inadequacies of models and opposing judgments [125].
7.3. Suggestions for improvement of the current situation
7.3.1. Clarity about fundamental issues in applications
As discussed in Section 7.1, it is important to provide clarity
about the conceptual understanding of risk, the adopted risk
deﬁnition and perspective, and insight in the scientiﬁc approach
taken to risk analysis. Fig. 5 provides a schematic overview of
concepts relevant for performing a risk analysis, which can be
useful for clarifying the foundations in applications.
First, the risk analysis is embedded in a decision context, which
sets the stage for the analysis by specifying the scope and focus of
the analysis, but also by providing limitations in terms of resources
(time, money, expertise) for performing the analysis. Where value
judgments are required, the decision context can also inform the
analysts to prefer conservative or optimistic inferences, so the
decision context and the risk analysis are not necessarily inde-
pendent [126].
Second, the risk analysis is conditional to a scientiﬁc approach
to risk analysis as a science, and a reasoned choice is required
between realist, proceduralist and constructivist approaches, as
outlined in Table 3. There is potential for disagreement between
various stakeholders in agreeing on the scientiﬁc approach, but a
reasoned discussion on a philosophical rather than on a personal
level may contribute to a decision. This can be facilitated by
considering the relevant literature, see Table 3.
Third, the conceptual understanding of risk and the object of
inquiry are considered. This means that clarity is needed about what
risk per se is, how it connects to other concepts relevant in the
analysis and what ontological, epistemological and normative impli-
cations this understanding has. As with the scientiﬁc approach to
risk analysis, different conceptual interpretations of risk exist and
disagreements may occur, but a reasoned choice can be made by
considering the relevant literature, e.g. [4,27,49,52,55,120]. Similarly,
an understanding of the object of inquiry is needed, to facilitate
which aspects are relevant for the application.
Fourth, the risk measurement process is systemized. A risk
deﬁnition stipulates speciﬁc features of the concept which are
considered important in a speciﬁc application, and suitable risk
measures are deﬁned. A risk perspective is delineated, systemizing
which measurement tools are applied, whether events or events and
consequences are analyzed and how the conﬁdence in the measure-
ment is conveyed to decision makers, see Table 2. The risk
perspective is thus the practically applied elements to describe risk,
in line with the adopted conceptual understanding and deﬁnition.
The operationalization of the object of inquiry speciﬁes which
features of the event and/or consequence are considered relevant
for the speciﬁc application, i.e. the events/consequences are con-
structed in view of the intended use of the risk model [127]. When
considered in the risk perspective, a method for conveying the
conﬁdence in the measurement is applied, e.g. using a qualitative
uncertainty assessment [28], an assessment of the strength of
evidence [29] or an assessment of biases in the risk model and
evidence [36,37]. The measurement is conditional to an evidence
base, which consists of data, information, models, expert knowledge
and assumptions.
The outline of Fig. 5 is a simpliﬁcation, but distinguishing the
conceptual level of risk and its object, the measurement in a particular
application, the evidence for making the measurement, the under-
lying scientiﬁc commitment to risk analysis as a science and the
relation to a decision context are important aspects to more clearly
articulate the foundations adhered to in a speciﬁc application.
7.3.2. Increased focus on foundational issues in the application area
Another ﬁnding resulting from the current work is that the
maritime transportation application area would beneﬁt from
intensifying research on foundational issues, as well as increased
reﬂection on proposed risk analysis methods. Various frameworks
have been proposed for analyzing maritime transportation risk,
e.g. [62,63,78,109]. Furthermore, many risk analysis applications
have been presented in the literature, see Section 5. However,
there has been very little scientiﬁc research and discussion on the
proposed frameworks and methods.
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A (non-exhaustive) list of issues requiring further scientiﬁc atten-
tion is given in [5], e.g. concerning research on the risk-conceptual
basis, methods for assessing and communicating uncertainty and the
causality of accident occurrence. Similar issues have been identiﬁed as
requiring attention in revising the guidelines for Formal Safety
Assessment (FSA), for decision making and rule development at the
International Maritime Organization (IMO) level [128]. Thus, rather
than being only academic exercises, research for strengthening the risk
analysis foundations can also have repercussions for maritime policy.
8. Conclusion
In this paper, a review and analysis has been presented of risk
deﬁnitions, perspectives and approaches to risk analysis science in
the maritime transportation application area. A classiﬁcation of
risk deﬁnitions, an overview of risk measurement tools and tools
for conveying information regarding the conﬁdence in the analysis
and a classiﬁcation of scientiﬁc approaches to risk analysis have
been used as a research method.
The main conclusions of this work are as follows. First, many
applications lack clarity about foundational issues concerning the
scientiﬁc method for risk analysis. Deﬁnitions for key terminology
are often lacking, perspectives are not introduced and no attention is
given to the scientiﬁc approach underlying the analysis. Second, the
analysis of applications in light of the foundational issues introduced
in Sections 2–4 shows that a large variety exists in the underlying
principles for risk analysis in the application area. Deﬁnitions are
mostly based on probabilities, but a minority of applications uses
possibility- or uncertainty-based deﬁnitions. Many different risk
measurement tools are applied, risk analyses focus either on events
or on events and consequences, and uncertainties/biases are only in
a minority of applications systematically considered. Applications
are found across the range for scientiﬁc approaches to risk analysis,
from strong realist over scientiﬁc proceduralist to moderate con-
structivist. Realist-based approaches are dominant.
Some suggestions are made to improve the current situation,
focusing on the adopted terminology and principles underlying the
risk analysis applications, and the need for a systematic considera-
tion of uncertainty/bias in qualifying the risk measurement.
It is hoped that this work can increase focus on fundamental
concepts and principles underlying future maritime transportation
risk analysis applications, and that it can act as a catalyst for
increased research and discussion for strengthening the scientiﬁc
basis for risk analysis. To the extent our analysis and discussion has
contributed to this end, the aim of this paper has been achieved.
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Appendix A. Example applications
In this section, a selected number of risk analysis applications
are addressed in more detail to exemplify the differences in the
adopted risk perspectives and approaches to risk analysis science.
As it is infeasible to discuss all methods in detail, three examples are
taken, representing the most commonly found approaches to risk
analysis science, applying different risk perspectives. Focus is on the
elements found in risk perspectives and the approach to risk
analysis science. Furthermore, some uncertainties are identiﬁed in
the methods (which are not addressed in the original applications)
to show the relevance of uncertainty treatment, and the interpret-
ability of the results is addressed. This last point has been raised as a
concern for practical decision making: it should be possible to
explain how to interpret the risk measurements [13,14].
Application M4 is represents the strong realist approach, see
Table 3. A probabilistic estimate of frequency and consequences of
collisions and groundings in a waterway is made. The method is
recommended by maritime authorities and regulatory organiza-
tions [1–3], and has been inﬂuential to other work realist
approaches (e.g. M10, M28, M34, M48), has been used in an
uncertainty quantiﬁcation approach (M50) and to estimate base-
line probabilities in a precautionary constructivist approach (M13).
Application M33 is chosen to illustrate the moderate realist
approach to risk science, see Table 3. Expert judgment is applied to
deﬁne a set of quantitative indicators, which are measured directly
from maritime trafﬁc data. The method has sparked further work
in M45. Indicators are rather rare measurement tools in the
application area and hence are interesting to consider.
M23 is chosen to exemplify the moderate constructivist approach.
The risk model is constructed based on expert judgments of the risk
levels of vessel interactions, from which a probability-like measure is
derived to measure the risk of collision in trafﬁc data. Ordinal probit
regression modeling is applied in this vessel conﬂict technique. This
method has sparked further work, e.g. M45.
A.1. Method M4: RA¼ I, R(Pf, A, C)
The method aims at estimating the collision and grounding
frequency and consequences in a waterway, with a sequence of
events as shown in Fig. A1. Three events are distinguished: ship–
ship encounter, collision, and structural damage. The number of
encounters NG is measured using trafﬁc data and an encounter
detection method. The frequency of collision accidents is mea-
sured using a frequentist probability derived from accident data.
Consequences are calculated using engineering models, but it is
Fig. 5. Outline of concepts for clarifying the risk analysis applications.
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not speciﬁed how exactly probabilities are derived. Here, focus is
on the collision frequency f (involving A1 and A2 of Fig. A1),
calculated as follows:
f ¼NGPC ðA1Þ
where NG is the number of encounters in a waterway area and PC
the probability of accident in an encounter.
For crossing waterways, the number of encounters is calculated
from the distribution of ship trafﬁc in a waterway as follows,








































Q ð1Þi and Q
ð2Þ
j are the ﬂow rates of vessels of subclasses i and j. L and
B represent ship length and width, V the ship speed and θ the
angle between the waterways. The cross-waterway trafﬁc distri-
butions f i
ð1Þ zið Þ and f ið2Þ zið Þ integrate to unity for crossing encoun-
ters, but for overtaking and meeting encounters, the shape of
these distributions affects the number of calculated encounters.
The procedure is based on the assumption of blind navigation, i.e.
under the premise that neither ship takes an evasive action prior
to collision.
The probability of an accident given an encounter is calculated
from accident statistics and is estimated as PC¼1.2104 [59].
This is a frequentist probability Pfn, because it is derived purely
from data, see Table 2.
The approach focuses on a true underlying risk, calculated using
trafﬁc-ﬂow analysis (A1), accident data (A2) and engineering models
(C). No expert judgment is applied and no uncertainty is assessed.
Decision making is strongly linked to the risk model: “[…] it should
be possible to derive probability-based codes for […]” ([59], p. 153).
From this, it is concluded that a strong realist scientiﬁc approach to
risk analysis is adhered to, see Table 3.
Focusing on the interpretability of the risk model, it is found
that it is not straightforward to provide a meaning to the model
elements. The measurement of event A1 (ship–ship encounter)
clearly is a strong simpliﬁcation of a real encounter process, which
is difﬁcult to relate to actual encounters. The event A2 (ship–ship
collision) is likewise measured using a strong simpliﬁcation, which
is difﬁcult to reconcile with actual collision accidents. In normal
operation and in ship–ship collision accidents, at least one of the
ships makes evasive action [129,130].
Interpreting the risk measurement tools also presents some
conceptual challenges. The probability PC has been explained as
“the probability that an accident will occur if the ship is on
collision course” ([97], p. 2). This seems intuitive enough, but
assigning this probability to a model parameter (A2, see Fig. 5)
representing a blind navigation collision is inconsistent: in prin-
ciple, the accident data should then only consider cases where
neither ship made an evasive action. Moreover, interpreting the
frequentist probability PC is difﬁcult, as such probabilities are
deﬁned through an inﬁnite repetition and require a speciﬁcation
of what is understood under “similar” events [13]. It can be
questioned whether a risk analysis should focus on mathematical
constructs such as NG and Pf [124].
Even though uncertainty is not addressed in M4, some impor-
tant uncertainties can be identiﬁed, see Table A1. A simple
uncertainty rating scheme is applied, proposed in [28] and brieﬂy
outlined in Appendix B. Each uncertainty factor is assessed using
four criteria, leading to an overall uncertainty rating Table A1.
Take for example ME3, the relation between the ﬂow rate and
the frequency of collisions. Based on trafﬁc ﬂow theory, the
number of encounters is quadratic with ﬂow rate, so it seems a
plausible assumption. Given the use of the same assumption in
other applications (e.g. M10, M13, M28, M34, M48, M50), but
contested in others (e.g. M42, M56), the agreement about the
model element is ambiguous. There is very little data supporting
the claim that increases in trafﬁc density in fact result in more
Fig. A1. Schematic overview of risk analysis application M4, based on [59].
2 AIS is a system where navigational parameters are transmitted from ships to
one another and to shore stations, allowing for improved situational awareness. It
provides a rich data source for studies in maritime transportation, containing
detailed information about vessel movements.
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collision accidents. Moreover, the phenomenon is not well under-
stood in maritime transportation, with varying approaches to
assess the relation leading to signiﬁcantly different results [12].
Related research in road trafﬁc has shown that the relation
between trafﬁc density and accident occurrence is complex,
involving a heuristic balancing of economy, risk-taking behavior
and comfort of road users. Areas with more trafﬁc conﬂicts may
even be safer due to increased awareness [131]. In maritime
transportation research, an investigation on the relation between
grounding accidents and trafﬁc density has also shown that no
clear dependency can be found [132]. For these reasons, ME3 is
considered to involve medium to high uncertainty.
A.2. Method M33: RA¼ II, R(IQU-A)
This method uses three risk indicators to analyze the risk of
collision in a Trafﬁc Separation Scheme (TSS) area3. A speed
dispersion index (IQU,1), an acceleration/deceleration index (IQU,2)
and a vessel conﬂict index (IQU,3) provide quantitative information
regarding the possibility of a collision in a given area, as schemati-
cally shown in Fig. A2. The identiﬁcation of indicators considered
relevant to assessing collision risk is based on judgments of naviga-
tional experts. IQU,1 and IQU,2 are situational characteristics obtained
directly from trafﬁc data, whereas IQU,3 is obtained from trafﬁc data,
using a ship domain model [88]. It is interesting to note that the
event occurrence itself is not modeled, but its likeliness is inferred
from the values of the indicators. Also, the risk perspective makes no
reference to consequences of the collision accident.
The application is understood to adopt a moderate realist
approach to risk analysis science. Even though expert judgment is
applied in devising the indicators, the application is rooted in the
idea that risk is a measureable property of the system. This follows
from the reasoning applied for making the indicators: “[existing] risk
reduction solutions are generally based on the qualitative and
subjective judgment from experts. There is no existing study to
quantitatively evaluate ship collision risks […]” ([88], p. 2030).
Quantiﬁcation is taken as an alternative to subjectivity, implying
that the quantiﬁcation provides better decision support than quali-
tative, subjective judgment. Even though expert judgment is applied
to identify risk indicators, the analysis heavily relies on data. No
uncertainty is assessed.
For the interpretation of the risk measurement tools, we
consider the acceleration/deceleration index IQU,2. This is intro-
duced as follows: “[…] acceleration and deceleration happen
under the condition that ships are about to cross, overtake, meet,
or turn, namely, scenarios with collision potentials. Higher degree
of acceleration indicates more frequent occurrence of scenarios
with collision potentials.” ([88], p. 2031). The indicator IQU,2 in a








where ak;i;Tj represents the acceleration of a consecutive pair of
data records, Ji;k the number of records of vessel i in a TSS area k
and Ik the number of ship trajectories found in TSS area k. The
acceleration or deceleration of consecutive records for vessel i in





where SOGk;i;T is the speed over ground of vessel i in leg k at time T.
The AIS data contains the time T and the speeds SOG for the
individual ships.
Interpreting IQU,2 is not straightforward, but it is possible. The
number represents the total acceleration/deceleration intensity of
all ships in a given area in a given time period. The number itself is
a mathematical construct, but it is an information carrier which
refers to an object which can be given a meaning.
Even though uncertainty is not addressed in M33, some
important uncertainties can be identiﬁed, see Table A2. The
uncertainty rating scheme introduced in Appendix B is applied
here as well, focusing on IQU,2. It is clear that important evidential
uncertainties underlie the risk model Table A2.
ME1 addresses the fact that Eq. (A4) measures acceleration, which
includes more navigational operations than collision avoidance. When
ships are involved in collision evasive maneuvering, it is feasible that
they slow down, either voluntarily or due to hydrodynamic forces in
the turning maneuvers. However, acceleration/deceleration is not
only because of collision evasive actions. Other reasons can be speed
adjustments to meet the ETA4 of pilot boarding or harbor entry, and
involuntary speed ﬂuctuations may occur due to tidal and wave
action. In this sense, the indicator’s speciﬁcity can be questioned as it
obfuscates the relation between the indicator IQU,2 and collision
occurrence, leading to measurement uncertainty.
ME2 addresses the fact that formula Eq. (A4) does not account for
the unequal sizes of the TSS areas. An uncertainty results from this
in relation to the number of AIS records in this area, as illustrated in
Fig. A2. Consider a speciﬁc ship trajectory, which in AIS data is
available as a set of points. If the number of data points in TSS area
km is systematically more (or less) than the number in area kn,
because e.g. the areas are not of equal size, this means that the
summation in Eq. (A4) is performed for a higher (or lower) number
of data points. It follows that larger (smaller) TSS areas will result in
a higher (lower) value for the indicator, not because of higher
collision risk but because of the larger considered area. Eq. (A4) does
not include a compensation mechanism for this, hence the values of
indicator IQU,2 are not dimensionally consistent across sea areas. This
leads to uncertainty about the speciﬁcity of the measurement.
Table A1
Uncertainties underlying risk analysis M4.
Model element CR1 CR2 CR3 CR4 Uncertainty rating
ME1 Encounter detection method N N Y/N N M–H
ME2 Collision probability equal for all encounters Y/N N Y/N N M–H
ME3 The relation between the ﬂow rate and the frequency of collisions is quadratic Y N Y/N N M–H
Note: CR1¼the assumptions are seen as very reasonable, CR2¼much relevant data are available, CR3¼there is broad agreement/consensus among experts, CR4¼the
phenomena involved are well understood, Y¼yes, N¼no, L¼ low, M¼medium, H¼high.
3 A TSS area is an area where ship trafﬁc is regulated, such that vessels are
required to follow certain sea lanes. 4 ETA: estimated time of arrival.
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A.3. Method M23: RA¼VII, R(Px, A)
This method uses a vessel conﬂict technique to analyze the risk
of collision in a waterway area. The basic idea is that the severity of
non-collision trafﬁc encounters can be ranked, and that this
information can be used to derive the probability of a collision.
For this, a procedure schematically shown in Fig. A3 is used. First, a
vessel conﬂict operator is constructed based on an ordered probit
regression modeling of expert judgments. Experts are asked to
assess the risk level in vessel interactions based on the proximity
indicators DCPA5 and TCPA6, for day and night conditions and for
different vessel sizes. The risk levels are interpreted as in Fig. A3,
and a mathematical operator C tð ÞjS is deﬁned. Second, this
operator is applied in vessel trafﬁc data for encounters involving
a vessel conﬂict, and a measure C0max is calculated. Finally, the
collision probability Px(A) is mathematically derived from the
ﬁtted distribution f ðA4Þð Þ to the empirical distribution p C 0max
 
.
The threshold value τHR corresponds to the separation between
serious and non-serious conﬂicts, i.e. based on the risk score RSm
corresponding to the “High risk” level. For details about the
calculation procedure, see [78]. The application makes no refer-
ence to consequences of the collision accident, i.e. the risk
perspective focuses on an event.
The application is understood to adopt a moderate constructivist
approach to risk analysis science. While the method relies on data
to determine collision risk, the basis of the method is a modeled
representation of judgments by navigational experts, i.e. a mental
construct of an assessor. The constructivist approach is also
reﬂected in the proposed validation method. Considering the risk
model to be used as an evaluative, diagnostic tool to assess the
effect of changes in a trafﬁc area, no demands are placed on the
method to correlate with observed accident frequencies. Rather, the
model results are compared with direct expert judgments of the
risk level in different waterway areas, stressing the centrality of
judgment in risk analysis. Uncertainties are not assessed.
Interpreting the risk measurement is difﬁcult, as it is a derived
measure from a ﬁtted distribution based on data collected through
running an expert judgment based model in trafﬁc data. Even though
an interpretation is given to the risk levels, see Fig. A3, this is not
unambiguous. Px(A) is calculated using the threshold value τHR,
corresponding to the action level “immediate actions needed”, i.e. a
level which does not per se imply a collision occurrence. However,
Px(A) is calculated from serious conﬂict cases (with C
0
max4τHR),
which are deﬁned as “encounter[s] that may pose risk of a certain
collision” ([78], p. 143). These deﬁnitions provide ambiguous infor-
mation for interpreting the risk measurement tool: Px(A) claims to be
the probability of collision, but it is derived from a risk level
corresponding to “encounters requiring immediate action”, also
deﬁned as “encounters which may pose risk of a certain collision”.
This circularity and inconsistency in the basic deﬁnitions obfuscate
what precisely is measured, and what the measurement means.
Even though uncertainty is not assessed, at least one important
uncertainty can be identiﬁed. This relates to the structure of the
vessel conﬂict operator, which assumes a linear combination of TCPA
and DCPA:
r¼ β^1DCPAþ β^2TCPA ðA6Þ
Here, DCPA and TCPA are instantaneous values of the spatial and
temporal proximity indicators in a vessel interaction, and β^i (i¼1,2)
are estimated coefﬁcients based on ordinal regression modeling of
questionnaire-based expert judgments. From research on vessel
domain analysis, it is known that in practice, navigators allow a
smaller or larger distance between the vessels depending on the
encounter angle [133–135]. Hence, navigators interpret the collision
risk not only in terms of DCPA and TCPA, but also in relation to the
Fig. A2. Schematic overview of risk analysis application M33, based on [88].
Table A2
Uncertainties underlying risk analysis.
Model element CR1 CR2 CR3 CR4 Uncertainty rating
ME1 IQU,2 (Eq. (A4)) measures accelerations, not only collision-avoidance maneuvers Y/N N/A Y/N Y/N M
ME2 The areas k for which IQU,2 (Eq. (A4)) is calculated are not of equal size N N/A Y/N N/A M–H
ote: CR1¼the assumptions are seen as very reasonable, CR2¼much relevant data are available, CR3¼there is broad agreement/consensus among experts, CR4¼the
phenomena involved are well understood, Y¼yes, N¼no, L¼ low, M¼medium, H¼high.
5 DCPA: distance to closest point of approach.
6 TCPA: time to closest point of approach.
F. Goerlandt, J. Montewka / Reliability Engineering and System Safety 138 (2015) 115–134 131
encounter angle. Take for example the situations in Fig. A4, with
equal TCPA and DCPA. According to the regression model, the risk
level is most likely “Very high risk”, which means that collision is
imminent, and that it cannot be avoided, see Fig. A3. For situation 1,
this may be plausible. However, in situation 2, which is an over-
taking encounter, this contradicts common navigational practice. It
seems more plausible to rank this situation under “Low risk”, i.e.
requiring safe navigational watch but not evasive action. This
implies that the vessel conﬂict operator may not appropriately rank
the detected encounters, leading to uncertainty in the shape of
distributions p(C0max) and f(C0max), and the calculated value for Px(A).
Appendix B. Uncertainty assessment scheme
Flage and Aven [28] propose a method to assess uncertainties
in a risk analysis application. A direct grading of the importance of
the uncertainty is performed through a judgment of an assessor of
four criteria. A justiﬁcation for the assessment of each criterion can
be provided.
The knowledge is weak (uncertainty is high) if all of the
following conditions are true:
(a) The assumptions made represent strong simpliﬁcations.
(b) Data are not available, or are unreliable.
(c) There is lack of agreement/consensus among experts.
(d) The phenomena involved are not well understood; models are
non-existent or known/believed to give poor predictions.
The knowledge is strong (uncertainty is low) if all of the
following conditions are met:
(a) The assumptions made are seen as very reasonable.
(b) Much reliable data are available.
(c) There is broad agreement/consensus among experts.
(d) The phenomena involved are well understood; the models
used are known to give predictions with the required accuracy.
Cases between these two extremes are classiﬁed as involving
medium knowledge (medium uncertainty).
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